The DDoS Zombie That Won't Let Go vs Skynet Lost the War in 2013. Its Malware Still Doesn't Know It.

Jenkins Script Console reachable from the internet without a password; Groovy code execution as the service account, no exploit required

delivery command tries five writable directories and three download tools (wget/curl/busybox wget) in turn, then runs the binary four times in a row

writes /etc/systemd/system/system-helper.service ("System Helper", Restart=always), enables it, then deletes its own file from disk

adds firewall chain LOCKER_INPUT dropping inbound traffic on SSH/Telnet/RDP/VNC ports so remote access cannot be restored

kills sshd, dropbear, ftpd, vncserver, xinetd and in.telnetd before the firewall rules go in

sets 19 download-tool binaries (wget/curl/tftp/scp/aria2c and others) to permission 000, and SIGKILLs ps/top/netstat/tcpdump/strace/gdb and a dozen other analysis tools the instant they start

deletes and recreates empty auth.log, syslog, messages, secure, wtmp, btmp, lastlog, faillog, dmesg, kern.log and the journal/audit directories

wipes .bash_history and .zsh_history for the current user and root

the process-blocklist table (gdb, strace, ltrace, objdump, readelf, strings, radare2, iaito, ghidra, binwalk) is stored XOR'd with 0xE7 at a fixed offset so it never appears in a strings dump; identical across both builds

background thread every 10 seconds: self-ptrace, TracerPid check, FNV-1a memory hash against a baseline, and a scan for the 0xCC breakpoint byte; any hit kills and relaunches the process from /proc/self/exe

renames its running process to kworker/0:0, mimicking a kernel worker thread that would never hold a network socket

hardcoded IPv4 literal and fixed port (83.168.69[.]95:9482); plain-text single-line protocol, no domain, no DNS lookup, no encryption, no fallback

on command, floods a named target using one of 11 methods (udpplain, syn, std, pps, ack, raknet, ssh, http, tcpstomp, minecraft, ovh)

fake lossless-audio release on Usenet; unpacks to an executable and a 58MB random-filler blob, no media content

3.7MB code section, 13% real code, 87% random filler/zero padding, 1,684 opaque predicates

import table declares only C-runtime housekeeping; functions resolved at runtime by manually walking the PEB and parsing export tables

~483 billion computed instructions (3-8 min CPU-saturated stall) before any file/registry/network activity, outlasting default sandbox timeouts

svchost.exe started suspended, written to, resumed: manually mapped image with no OS record of the module

ntdll.dll remapped writable in every injected process; read as ZeuS installing its own form-grabbing hooks, not anti-EDR unhooking

IRC C2 over Tor v2 hidden services; per-victim inbound hidden service on non-standard port 55080

CGMiner GPU mining, idle-gated (starts after 2 minutes without user input, stops on touch)